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As a result of ideological opposition or the reduction of his writing to mere propaganda, 
the legacy of Thomas Paine within mainstream political theory has remained largely unexplored. 
Never a friend to the elite or powerful, Paine’s torch was carried by the common men, trade 
unionists and socialists, who found in him a kindred spirit. While his reputation and character 
have been restored in recent decades, scholars still do not assign his legacy enough value.  
One avenue of investigation that is not present in the literature is a connection to 
sociologist Jane Addams, who served as an honorary vice president for the Thomas Paine 
Monument Association. In particular, Addams’ political anthropology bears a number of distinct 
similarities to that of Thomas Paine, and she applied many of these views through her work at 
Hull House. Beyond the purely historical connections, these similarities in their respective 
political anthropologies can also be revealed through thorough examination of both thinkers’ 
accounts of pre-civilization (or the state of nature), the rise of civilization, and how civilization 
ought to be treated normatively. In this thesis, based on the above revelations, I find that Thomas 
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In the last two hundred years of scholarship in political theory, perhaps no figure has 
been as unduly maligned as Thomas Paine, which is unsurprising considering his affinity for 
rhetorically eviscerating men and institutions of authority and esteem. Paine has always been 
rightly recognized by historians as a Founding Father of the United States for the critical roles 
Common Sense and The American Crisis played in the American Revolution, as well as for his 
undeniable influence on figures like Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and Mary 
Wollstonecraft. However, Paine, for nearly a century after his death in 1809, was the victim of 
seemingly relentless ad hominem attacks. Some were likely motivated by Paine’s scathing open 
letter to George Washington in 1796, labeling him an “incompetent general and elitist president 
who had betrayed Paine [by] not protecting him when he claimed American citizenship when 
arrested by France” (Grimm). Others were provoked by “Paine’s scathing criticisms [in The Age 
of Reason] of religion, in general, and of Christianity, in particular,” which were unsettling to a 
deeply religious United States in the midst of the Second Great Awakening (Marker). Two of the 
vilest critiques came from George Chalmers, a Tory in the service of a vengeful British 
government, and James Cheetham, a New York journalist and Republican radical who had ended 
a friendship with Paine after a series of personal arguments (Bernstein 894). Instead of engaging 
with Paine’s work substantively, both men attacked Paine’s character and upbringing. Paine, the 
son of a Quaker stay-maker, was no genteel figure, which, according to his enemies, represented 
a lack of virtue. To Chalmers and Cheetham, “no good ideas could ever come from so corrupt 
and degraded a source” (Bernstein 894). As such, even modern scholarship is still exploring the 
true depths of Paine’s legacy.  
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 Often, Paine’s political theory is taken to be a more radical version of John Locke (which 
is decidedly not the case), or is simply discounted entirely due to Paine’s negative historical 
reputation (Bernstein 876). But Paine never meant to be an object of affection for academics, nor 
was he interested in virtue outside what was expected of a good citizen. As those in power 
ignored or mocked him, “many American trade unions, slavery abolitionists, suffragettes, 
socialists and civil rights groups claimed Paine as their key inspiration” (O’Neill). Though 
thinkers such as Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon likely had little direct engagement with 
Paine’s works, they came into contact with and were presumably affected by the radicals and 
trade unionists who did (Weisser 14). Even Abraham Lincoln was an avid follower of Paine’s 
politics and deism in his youth, though his admiration for Paine was kept secret in order to 
protect his political career (Brookheiser). In 1892, this undercurrent developed into a mainstream 
movement with the publication of Moncure D. Conway’s biography of Paine. “Though at times 
too fiercely defensive of Paine's character, Conway's biography of Paine and his comprehensive 
edition of Paine's writings became landmarks still regarded as authoritative more than a century 
after their first appearance” (Bernstein 895).  
Curious scholars began to investigate Paine’s political theory, notably his political 
anthropology, but many, including Columbia University’s C.E. Merriam, Jr., still considered it 
impossible to view him as a “great political thinker” (Merriam 402). Merriam, in particular, saw 
Paine as an activist and “agitator” who exerted influence through “popular rather than scientific” 
means (Merriam 402). That being said, this impossibility was not universally agreed on at the 
time, and much later works such as Robert Lamb’s Thomas Paine and the Idea of Human Rights 
have served to elevate Paine’s reputation as a legitimate political theorist to a great extent 
(Philp). To these scholars, Paine was not only “a visionary and a scientist” (Kiley 1), but a 
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theorist with a political anthropology1 that was not only distinct from Locke, Hobbes, or 
Rousseau, but also uniquely insightful in terms of normative civilization (Widerquist and McCall 
216-217).  
Evidence of disagreement can also be found in the Thomas Paine National Historical 
Association (TPNHA), of which Conway was the inaugural president, the first of numerous late 
nineteenth century “Paine societies” that were devoted to the preservation of Paine’s reputation, 
lost remains, and political works (Conway). Despite their academic background, many Paine 
societies became heavily involved in local community affairs, commissioning statues, founding 
museums, and even naming streets after Paine in New Rochelle, New York, where Paine lived 
between 1802 and 1806 (“History of the Thomas Paine Cottage Museum”). Conway himself was 
a journalist and focused more on Paine’s historical reputation than the impact of his political 
theory, but his reintroduction of Paine to mainstream academic discourse proved to be the 
catalyst for positive scholarly re-engagement with Paine’s works (particularly the Rights of Man 
and Agrarian Justice) on a theoretical basis, especially in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Though this re-engagement was not enough to substantively change the ambivalent 
academic attitude toward Paine on a large scale, the study of Paine no longer was a threat to a 
scholar’s career. This shift allowed Paine societies to grow an academic wing, and begin to 
engage in scholarly discourse in their own right. 
One Paine society, a sister group to the TPNHA, that fostered ideological engagement 
with Paine was the Thomas Paine Monument Association (TPMA), which was founded by 
author and religious radical Joseph Lewis. Lewis wrote on Paine extensively and even claimed 
that Paine was the true author of the Declaration of Independence (Marotta 187). Among other 
                                                 
1 Political anthropology in this thesis will refer to the analysis of the evolution of human societies, particularly from 
pre-civilization to civilization. 
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activities, Lewis and the TPMA claimed credit for the statue of Thomas Paine in his birthplace of 
Thetford, England. The organization counted intellectual titans like Clarence Darrow, Thomas 
Edison, Albert Einstein, George Creel, Margaret Sanger, and Jane Addams among its honorary 
vice-presidents (Marotta 187-188).  
Of these figures, Jane Addams is of the most interest. On the surface, Addams, as 
reformist as she was radical, is an unlikely candidate to claim Paine as an ideological influence. 
Operating firmly within the pragmatist and progressive traditions, Addams argued that there 
exists a moral obligation to understand, engage, and form relationships with others (Democracy 
and Social Ethics 9). To that end, Addams, along with her friend and paramour Ellen Gates 
Starr, founded Hull House in 1889, a settlement house designed to promote social interaction and 
engagement in the humanities for members of Chicago’s working class. Addams would simplify 
these lofty goals by referring to them as the three Rs: research, reform, and residence (“1890-
1900: The Three R’s”). As such, Hull House required a “thick” concept of democracy to be 
successful, one that far outgrew the underlying assumptions about natural rights under which the 
American Constitution operates. Knowledge, to Addams, was something to be acquired through 
empathy and lived experience rather than abstract conceptions of human nature. This “thick” 
democracy, acting as a way of life rather than a form of government, would adjust to the needs of 
the community. Therefore, much of Addams’ Newer Ideals of Peace emphatically rejected 
notions of “the rights of man” in favor of the contemporary “duties of humanity” and lampooned 
many of America’s Founding Fathers who relied so heavily on the former (27). This is quite the 
departure from Thomas Paine, a champion of natural rights, the title of whose masterwork as, 
after all, The Rights of Man. 
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However, Addams’ stern focus on the present did not mean that she did not value history, 
nor did she ignore political anthropology as a subject. Though she never published a formal 
treatise on either topic, a recognizable political anthropology is present in bits and pieces 
throughout her many works. Without one, her argument why humans have a fundamental, social 
need to understand each other could hardly be sustained. It is here where a connection to Thomas 
Paine can be drawn. Though Paine wrote on political anthropology more extensively than 
Addams, he, too, did so in numerous works, and his views changed as he matured as a theorist. 
The Thomas Paine that wrote Common Sense (1776) was not the same person or theorist as the 
one who wrote Rights of Man (1791-1792) and Agrarian Justice (1797). Addams also refined 
and changed many of her political views throughout her lifetime, but her political anthropology 
retained its core principles and overall cohesiveness. It is the case that, as Addams was an 
honorary vice president of the Thomas Paine Monument Association, she almost certainly would 
have been intimately familiar with and fond of Paine’s works. I contend that overlaps of their 
respective political anthropologies are likely no coincidence. Despite this evidence of overlap 
and association, any relationship between Addams and Paine remains entirely unexplored in 
scholarly literature. 
 In this thesis, I will argue that Thomas Paine exercised intellectual influence on Jane 
Addams in terms of her political anthropology, as demonstrated historically through Addams’ 
honorary vice presidency in the TPMA. Theoretically speaking, the two thinkers share many 
similarities in their descriptive views of pre-civilization, their descriptive analyses of how early 
civilizations functioned, and their normative arguments concerning what civilization ought to 
look like. Once my analysis is complete, I will then offer avenues for future research further 
connecting Paine to Addams.  
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The mature (1790s and beyond) version of Thomas Paine, as in the one present in Rights 
of Man and Agrarian Justice, is whose political anthropology bears the most similarity to that of 
Jane Addams. Therefore, it presumably would have been of the most interest to her 
academically, meaning only primary and secondary source material written by and about this 
particular version of Paine should be considered. Since, as mentioned previously, Addams 
directly addressed her political anthropology sparsely (but consistently), it is appropriate to 





1. THE STATE OF NATURE 
Prior to the 1960s, anthropology as a field, but particularly political anthropology, was 
dominated by colonialist thought. The study had always been infatuated with power and politics 
in “primitive” societies, an infatuation that was deeply linked with Enlightenment-era political 
theory. Despite the fact both Thomas Paine and Jane Addams held comparatively progressive 
viewpoints for their respective times, they were by no means exempt from the very colonialist 
variant of materialism that dominated scholarly discussion. One of the predominant interests in 
this early materialism, born out of Enlightenment empiricism, sought to consider how humans 
lived before the rise of governments. This form of human interaction formed the core of later 
arguments asserting both what is “natural” for humans to do and how people engage with one 
another without the force of government. This pre-civilized existence is called the “state of 
nature,” and most thinkers considered it to be an abstraction. The first articulations of the state of 
nature were developed thousands of years ago by the Chinese political theorists Mozi, Xunzi, 
and Liu Zongyuan (Ho 134), but the most famous theories originated in the French, British, and 
American Enlightenment, to which Thomas Paine was a vital contributor. As we will come to 
discover, Addams’ later empiricism2 was not as far removed from the state of nature 
(specifically Paine’s conception of it) as one may think, and this interpretation of the state of 
nature was critical in her later derivation of human nature. In this chapter, I will discuss and 
reveal similarities between Paine and Addams’ perceptions of the state of nature, particularly in 
regard to how people act towards one another in a pre-governmental state.  
                                                 
2 Pragmatist epistemology was unique, but closely related to John Stuart Mill’s empiricism.  
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Paine wrote extensively about the state of nature earlier in his career, most notably in 
Common Sense. In the decade-and-a-half between Common Sense and Rights of Man, Paine’s 
interpretation of human nature, which is intrinsic to the state of nature, became much more 
favorable. What was once evil and conniving could suddenly be perfect if the right conditions 
were present. In Common Sense, Paine identified government as being the result of man’s 
wickedness, and it was this wickedness that formed the basis of his later arguments in the 
pamphlet. Human goodness was secondary. By the time of Rights of Man, Paine thought 
differently. While government was still a necessary evil, it was man’s corruptibility (caused by 
government) that was in the background of man’s potential perfectibility (Foner 91). However, 
despite this change in Paine’s perception of human nature, there is nothing that indicates the 
structure of the state of nature changed — only the conclusions that one could draw from it. If 
anything, his anthropological work in Rights of Man and Agrarian Justice was built on top of his 
argument in Common Sense, effectively both reinterpreting and reinforcing it with more detail 
and analysis. Therefore, it is still consistent with the scholarship of late Paine to include his 
writings concerning the state of nature in Common Sense, provided that only the structure and 
qualities of the state of nature are considered, and not its implications and assumptions regarding 
human nature. Those can be found in Rights of Man while still being consistent with his previous 
description of the state of nature. 
What makes Paine’s state of nature unique compared to his relative contemporaries is 
that his state of nature was no abstraction. To illustrate his state of nature, Paine “[supposed] a 
small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the 
rest…[would represent] the first peopling of any country, or the world” (Paine 7). These pre-
civilized societies, Paine believed, could and do exist in contemporary times. He pointed Native 
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Americans out in particular (Johansen 282), but unlike other theorists of the Enlightenment, he 
did not view the Native Americans as intrinsically inferior beings; he did not share the white 
man’s burden of John Locke. In later stages of his Paine’s writing, he went as far as to praise 
their way of life in comparison to the poor of Europe, further expanding on the idea that that 
state of nature was not a bleak and destitute landscape filled with widespread human suffering. 
In this state of nature, humankind would exist in a “state of natural liberty” (Paine 7), and 
each person was responsible for ensuring their own justice. This state of natural liberty included 
the practice of natural rights, which Paine argued were derived from creation, inherent to human 
existence, and practicable without a state to defend them, in contrast to civil rights, which 
required the force of a government to defend them. More concretely, Paine considered natural 
rights to be “intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as an 
individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the rights of others” 
(Lamb 59). While Paine was, at heart, an individualist, he did argue that humans living in the 
state of nature would seek out society, which existed before government was ever created. These 
rights were rooted in the fundamental and natural equality of humankind, and existed without 
consideration for tradition or generation, though their application in a later constitution could 
vary based on the particular society. Paine argued that without society, it would be difficult if not 
impossible to build a dwelling, procure, transport, and erect timber, battle hunger, and survive 
disease (Paine 7). For these reasons, society, in contrast to government, was a “blessing” that 
was a source of happiness and prosperity for humans (Paine 6).  
However, Paine’s state of nature was fraught with serious concerns. He maintained that 
while individuals possessed all of their natural rights in the state of nature, these rights could not 
always be adequately protected against violence or injustice, necessitating that “the first settlers 
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in any region quickly abandon the state of nature and form themselves into a society for mutual 
assistance and protection” (Boller 67). While this violence and injustice was perhaps not quite as 
extreme as the ones illustrated by Thomas Hobbes or (to a much lesser extent) John Locke, it 
was enough to necessitate the development of a formal government and illustrate the limits of 
human perfectibility. Humanity may have the possibility to become perfect, but enough will fail 
to achieve perfection that it requires the establishment of formal safeguards. In this sense, the 
foundations of society were a general dependence on others and common interests. Despite 
Paine’s unrelenting mistrust of government, he was no anarchist. A constitution outlining the 
rule of law, rather than the propagation of war or force, would be the instrument of justice in this 
new social state, which necessitated the creation of a government to enforce it. 
Addams, on the other hand, appears to have been largely skeptical of the existence of 
abstract rights, and an account of the state of nature was not critical to the success of her 
scholarly work. As she was concerned first and foremost with the trials and tribulations of 
industrial society, any commentary directed towards the state of nature or abstract rights in 
general was limited and typically served as a critique of Enlightenment ideals3. However, 
Addams did clearly demarcate a line between civilized and uncivilized, noting that “civilization 
is the substitution of law for war” (Newer Ideals of Peace 219). Like Paine, Addams detested 
war, seeing it as a waste of youth and an avenue for motivations rooted in self-interest to 
dominate decision-making. She viewed civilization as a way to escape war’s horror rather than a 
tool to perpetuate it. A truly civilized society would be one with the ability to engage without 
organized violence — a fact she thought many people had forgotten (Newer Ideals of Peace 219-
                                                 
3 John Dewey, Addams’ dear friend and ideological soulmate, did allow for the existence of “natural freedoms” 
prior to the growth of civilization (Boller 70). Considering the depth of the two’s relationship, it is possible Addams 




220). It is reasonable to deduce that Addams developed her view of the state of nature from 
Paine. Paine’s state of nature, being social and communal while also retaining Lockean elements, 
is distinct enough that its influence is detectable in Addams’ thinking. An obvious distaste for 
violence as a barbarous quality is a feature that both thinkers share, and, considering her 
honorary vice presidency in the TPMA, it is unlikely that Addams developed her account in a 
vacuum. Paine was not a pacifist in the same manner as Addams, but he did not need to be in 
order to have some measure of influence on her account of the state of nature. Their account of 
peace being the end (or one of the ends) of civilization was the same, they would merely have 
disagreed on whether war was a means to the end of peace, with Paine arguing yes and Addams 
arguing no. 
 Another defining feature that Paine described within the state of nature was “the unity 
and equality of man” (Paine 463). According to Paine, “Man is all of one degree, and 
consequently...all men are born equal, and with equal natural rights, in the same manner as if 
posterity had been continued by creation instead of generation” (Paine 463). This argument for 
natural equality was nothing new. Outwardly similar arguments had been proffered by Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke beforehand, but Paine’s natural equality had a quality that made it 
distinct. Instead of relying on Hobbes’ psychological egoism, or Locke’s tabula rasa4, Paine 
predicated his natural equality on the basis that “the world is as new to a [newly born man] as it 
was to the first man who existed.” He thereby expanded Locke’s argument for sensory 
knowledge into a full body of lived experiences. Therefore, for Paine, “There never did, there 
never will, and there never can exist a [person or government which possesses] the power of 
                                                 
4 Locke argued that the human mind was a blank slate, or tabula rasa, upon birth, and that knowledge was gained 




binding or countrouling posterity to the end of time” (Paine 438). While this is, in the end, a 
normative argument, it is descriptive in the sense that Paine observes natural equality as existing 
through lived experience. In this light, Paine’s view of generations as people who have the same 
rights and standing as all others before them, but different laws resulting from their varying 
needs and experiences, bears a great deal of similarity to Jane Addams’ own understanding of 
what “natural'' human equality entailed.  
When discussing human equality, Addams was not shy in critiquing the eighteenth-
century thinkers with whom Paine is often associated, often pejoratively labeling them as 
“reformers” (Democracy and Social Ethics 42). To Addams, these reformers had a fundamental 
inability to advance their thought beyond the state of nature. She accused them of developing an 
“essentially unprogressive human nature in all the empty dignity of its inborn rights” (Newer 
Ideals of Peace 32), failing to adequately apply and adapt those abstract rights to the needs of 
modern generations. Instead, Addams demands that mankind “throw down unnatural divisions” 
and incorporate moral idealism as a “force of progress” (Democracy and Social Ethics 42). 
Moreover, these demands rely on lived experience as an essential source of both information and 
governance, with law and policy progressing with the times as part of her “thicker” democracy 
— guidance firmly in line with what Paine proposed in Rights of Man, where he argued that it 
was wrong for a generation to firmly bind the future to their whims. Even closer to Paine was her 
argument that while humans may have different characteristics, the similarities are far more 
numerous, and that those similarities represent human equality (Curti 241). 
In Addams’ mind, Paine may have represented an exception to the above generalization 
of eighteenth-century thinkers. While Paine was deeply committed to natural rights and 
postulated that all civil rights are derived from some natural right (Paine 464), he was also highly 
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critical of nations that relied on old principles, decrying states that indulged in “the vanity and 
presumption of governing beyond the grave” (Paine 438). Moreover, Paine’s rights were not 
abstract concepts — they were essential and living components of his wider political theory, 
living alongside generational advances (Lamb 25). Paine struggled throughout his life to 
reconcile his natural rights doctrine with his equally vigorous belief in lived experience as a core 
element of his political anthropology. The latter is reflected in the thought of Jane Addams. 
Addams was deeply committed to a politics born out of lived experience, and, based on her 
intellectual relationship with John Dewey, she may not have rejected the concept of natural 
freedom entirely, meaning that Paine’s mockery of generational binding could possibly have 
been met with amusement on the part of Addams. With similar logical commitments and lines of 





2. REASON AND HUMAN NATURE 
However, the state of nature would be of little concern if it did not have serious 
implications for human nature and human reason. Few thinkers ever developed a comprehensive 
political anthropology without accounting for their impacts on humans themselves. For some, the 
source was a divine gift or wisdom, while for others (especially after Charles Darwin’s 
publication of On the Origin of Species), human nature was centered in natural processes like 
evolution. While Paine was definitely more in line with the former perspective, and Addams with 
the latter, this does not mean that the core aspects of their thought are mutually exclusive. As a 
matter of fact, Paine’s approach to reasoning was a substantially similar but somewhat archaic 
version of materialism or standpoint epistemology. In this chapter, I will begin by establishing 
Thomas Paine’s version of human nature, particularly in terms of virtue and human interaction, 
and theoretically link it to that of Jane Addams. Then, I will address how their perspectives on 
human nature relate to their application of reason. Finally, I will address their noticeable shared 
perspective on said reason, and how for both thinkers, reason and human nature acted in tandem 
with one another. This section is meant to provide a bedrock for the appropriation of these 
qualities to interpret “primitive” civilization.  
Paine’s vision of human nature was central to his political anthropology and formed the 
descriptive basis on which he later developed his normative claims. Paine thought that the core 
of human nature was the capacity to reason, which he evaluated as an evolution of a divine gift. 
From a divine perspective, reason was treated in a manner similar to rights, as well as existence 
itself, as having come “from the hand of his Maker” (Paine 462). Despite it being the case that 
Paine ruthlessly criticized religion (especially Christianity) in The Age of Reason, he was no 
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atheist. On the contrary, Paine’s defense of reason would be incoherent without his deism, which 
was influenced by multiple Christian groups (particularly Quakers and Presbyterians), as human 
reason was both a gift from God demonstrated within the ability to “see something in the world” 
and a mechanism to “grasp the existence of God and know His character” (Lamb 197). 
Importantly, Paine does not use God “to derive any specific moral duties...beyond the protection 
of rights and the (subjectively interpreted) obligation to serve Him” (Lamb 197). It would then 
follow that reason acts as God’s gift, a tool to enable humans to see and interpret nature in all of 
its magnificence. This sense of reason as a divine tool informs Paine’s argument regarding how 
humans utilize reason to interact with the world around them.  
Earlier in his life, Paine adopted a pessimistic approach to human nature, seeing 
government (particularly authoritarian forms of government) as an example of its pitiful state. 
But by the time he wrote Rights of Man, Paine’s depiction of human nature had warmed 
considerably, believing that reason could be used to achieve human perfectibility. To reason 
properly, as he demonstrated through his analysis of the changing “natural dispositions” of 
France and England towards one another (Paine 595), Paine argued “certain facts, principles, or 
data, [need to be reasoned] from,” which then “must be established, admitted, or denied” (Paine 
461). In essence, one had to experience the world and its inhabitants, as well as be properly 
educated in how to process one’s experiences, in order to understand it accurately. The world 
changed over time, and to an extent, so did people, though their fundamental rights and nature 
did not. Since governments created through superstition or conquest rather than reason (to be 
discussed later) inhibit the proper application of reason, it can be concluded “that man, were he 
not corrupted by governments, is naturally the friend of man, and that human nature is not of 
itself vicious” (Paine 595). In this sense, a person, a friend by nature to other people, could also 
18 
 
use their reason to live their lives in the image of God — in other words, a virtuous life. 
“Although Paine does not provide an exhaustive account of the virtues we would expect to 
ascribe to a Deity, there are some qualities that he does emphasize,” including but not limited to 
“truthfulness, honesty, mercifulness, justice, and generosity” (Lamb 184-185).  
Most important among these was civic virtue, which referred to active participation in 
government and public life. Though Paine treated civic virtue as a right rather than a duty, it 
essentially functioned as a duty, and any person who desired to live in the image of God had an 
obligation to perform in civic life. This was a common belief at the time, but was most often 
attributed to the aristocracy or the clergy. Paine, however, known to view both groups with 
disdain, applied this principle altogether more democratically via his res publica (Belchem), 
which will be elaborated on later. Thus, Paine does not only consider both genuine human 
compassion and relationships formed for motivations other than self-interest to be possible, he 
considers them to be natural. Paine did not believe that humans were perfect by design, or even 
were likely to ever achieve perfection, but he did take an extremely objective view of human 
perfectibility as a possibility (Foner 91). People could achieve perfectibility if they followed their 
reason to the letter, and engaged with their fellow citizens in civic life, rather than through self-
interest or the dictations of their passions. This was not necessarily a telos5 for human existence, 
as Paine was primarily concerned with duty in the context of rights, but it could certainly be 
considered a goal or an ideal for humanity.  
Even though Jane Addams was neither personally religious (despite her upbringing by a 
Quaker-raised father) nor interested in a large treatise on divine reason (Curti 243), she deduced 
through her experiences that religion should not be rejected, as it frequently served as an 
                                                 
5 A telos refers to an ultimate objective or purpose. 
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important public good, a fascination she referred to as “cosmic patriotism” (Newer Ideals of 
Peace 237). Among other things, “cosmic patriotism” could be a source of human righteousness 
and serve as a tool for establishing a moral order. However one defined this cosmic force, 
Addams believed “it may yet be strong enough to move masses of men out of their narrow 
national considerations and cautions into new reaches of human effort and affection” (Newer 
Ideals of Peace 237). She thus highlights a function of reason even if reason alone did not serve 
as a guide for humanity. Reason was but one tool for humanity and was useless when all human 
emotions and passions were denied in order to worship at its altar. Moreover, contrary to many 
of her allies and contemporaries, Addams was not at all hostile to Christianity, especially when it 
was applied to service towards others and good moral behavior. Addams found, true to her 
Quaker background, that a particular source of positive cosmic patriotism was the Bible, noting 
that no reason to pursue peace among men was “so modern, so fundamental and so trenchant, as 
the address which was read from the prophet Isaiah” (Newer Ideals of Peace 237). 
From this righteousness, Addams derives her perspective on human nature. She used the 
term often in her writing, but, as was common in her time, she never gives an explicit definition 
of it. That being said, her meaning becomes clear through her works. Addams was extremely 
fond of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, and her conception of human nature heavily 
incorporates the theory of evolution. For example, Addams recognized the “nature and role of 
sex in the life of the individual, but she also saw its relation to civilization. In her view of human 
nature, play and recreation are basic needs which brook denial only at heavy cost. Fighting is of 
course a part of human nature, but so is cooperation” (Curti 241). Furthermore, she pinpointed 
that “in the process of evolution, of survival through adaptation, he came to have impulses that 
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set him apart from other animals in somewhat the way that the human hand enabled him to claw 
his way to a civilization denied his less well equipped fellow creatures” (Curti 245).  
While Addams’ account of human nature is by no means identical to Paine’s, his 
influence is still detectable throughout her works, and clearly contributed to how she viewed 
human nature as a whole. For instance, she placed particular emphasis on children and how they 
develop into the world around them. She described their “presumably innate tendency of children 
to seek in ceremonial expression a sense of identification with man's primitive life and kinship 
with the past,” at least until they grew old enough to understand their place in their own world 
(Curti 242). Perhaps this sense of identification was a form of lost history, or it may have even 
held a biological component, but Addams considered it to be a defining component of childhood, 
particularly early childhood. This loneliness could also be rectified with love and compassion 
from others (not simply their parents) around them — which can be argued is in line with Paine’s 
fundamental assertion that man is a friend of man.  
Paine’s influence becomes even more overt when Addams ponders “man's primordial 
concern for group feeding of the young and the sense of responsibility for helping those in 
need…[which] might check and control the more recently acquired habit of mass killing of one's 
own kind” (Curti 246). Peace, then, was an achievable end, since human nature already called for 
it. While Paine was not a pacifist in the manner of Addams (his enthusiastic support for the 
American Revolution making that a mere statement of fact), that does not preclude his vision of 
a generally peaceful human nature from having influenced her. Paine loved and desired peace, 
and he was no warmonger. He simply thought war was an occasional necessity to a greater 
extent than Addams. Moreover, it is clear that Addams viewed society as a blessing much in the 
same manner that Paine did, one with enormous benefits to humankind. As Paine was one of the 
21 
 
first to universalize human goodness, peace, and equality within the state of nature as well as in a 
more cosmopolitan state, whether Addams directly drew this analysis from Paine is irrelevant. It 
would have come from him in some form or fashion either way.  
Although Addams was not as devoted to reason as Paine, its influence on their respective 
perspectives on human identity is evident. While both thinkers clearly rejected Christianity on a 
personal level, they apply their Quaker tendencies similarly. It is possible that Addams might 
have developed her application of Christianity to political anthropology in complete 
independence from Paine, but, at minimum, she would have found in him a kindred spirit. 
Whether God was real (Paine) or an abstract concept with a firm basis in reality (Addams), their 
common argument held that people view (whether or not they are correct being largely 
irrelevant) reason as a gift or creation of God, and a relatively positive perception of human 
nature develops accordingly. When combined with their similar visions of the state of nature and 
natural equality, the relationship is evident. At this level, human emotion, passion, and sympathy 






3. THE RISE OF CIVILIZATION 
Thus far, it has been established that the political anthropologies of Thomas Paine and 
Jane Addams intersect when it comes to the state of nature and human nature. This similarity 
was born out of how they applied religious commitments in the pre-civilized state. It is certainly 
possible that this likeness is coincidental. But no legitimate political anthropology can tie itself to 
the state of nature for all posterity, and Paine (in Rights of Man) and Addams (In Newer Ideals of 
Peace) were each critical of those thinkers who struggled to remove themselves from the past, 
whether this be in the form of a formal state of nature or an overreliance on culture and tradition. 
Subsequently, Paine and Addams both developed objective accounts of how humans transitioned 
from an uncivilized to civilized state (though Paine’s account was far more overt and elaborate 
than that of Addams), specifically relying on a material understanding of history for their 
analyses. In this chapter, I will explain Paine’s material understanding of history, and describe 
the foundation of governments on superstition, conquest, and reason (particularly the former 
two). Then, I will delve into Addams’ account of the historical method, its inquiry into the 
relationship between property and feudalism, and how her account correlates with Paine’s. 
Finally, I will attempt to outline an approach that Paine and Addams jointly utilized to interpret 
the historical development of civilization. This context of the transition between uncivilized and 
civilized is essential to understand the normative argument Paine and Addams make regarding 
civilization later.  
Since the crux of my argument in this chapter will center around concepts extremely 
similar to historical materialism, it is important to outline what this method of analysis entails. At 
its core, historical materialism “analyses the hidden mainsprings that underpin the development 
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of human society from the earliest tribal societies up to the modern day,” and argues that “those 
who deny the existence of any laws governing human social development invariably approach 
history from a subjective and moralistic standpoint” (Woods). Prior to Karl Marx and Freidrich 
Engels, who, in the mid nineteenth century, created and popularized historical materialism and 
attempted to incorporate the scientific method into political theory, many theorists viewed 
history to be “a series of accidents” without any form of general explanation (Woods). However, 
despite dying a decade before Karl Marx was born, Thomas Paine’s account of political 
anthropology incorporated a vast number of the hallmarks of historical materialism, to the point 
where I will henceforth refer to it as a material understanding of history. I do not attempt to 
argue that Paine anticipated Marx and Engels, nor do I attempt to argue that Marx and Engels 
were influenced by Paine. Addams, on the other hand, was deeply familiar with Marx (Graham), 
and incorporated much of his terminology into her own political anthropology. Still, other 
aspects of her account are much closer to Paine than they are to Marx, and she also incorporated 
the “historical method” seen in anthropological studies of her time.6  
Paine’s account of how civilizations were formed was methodological and to a certain 
extent chronological. He argued that “[civilizations] may be all comprehended under three heads. 
First, Superstition. Secondly, Power, Thirdly, the common interest of society, and the common 
rights of man” (Paine 466). The first two descriptions, which will be elaborated shortly, were 
mostly descriptive in nature, while the latter, which for the sake of clarity will be referred to as 
“reason,” was primarily normative, and thus will be discussed later. In many areas of Paine’s 
writing, it is difficult to distinguish his descriptive arguments from his normative ones. Even 
                                                 
6 The historical method, similar but separate to historical materialism, was an anthropological mechanism used to 
outline the development of “lower civilizations” to “higher civilizations.” It was typically used to justify racism and 
colonialism. While Addams’ account did include racist assumptions, her argument in sum was egalitarian. 
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when he merely stated facts, he did so with such ferocity and passion that the descriptions almost 
became normative. This is especially the case when he discusses government by conquest. In 
addition, for the purposes of this chapter, it is important to note that Paine did consider the young 
United States and, at the time, the infant French Republic to be governments that arose through 
reason, so there was a small descriptive element to that argument.  
The first form of government in Thomas Paine’s material interpretation of history was 
centered on priests and religion. In Paine’s mind, during this phase of history, “a set of artful 
men pretended, through the medium of oracles, to hold intercourse with the Deity, as familiarly 
as they now march up the back-stairs in European courts, the world was completely under the 
government of superstition” (Paine 466). Paine was intensely disdainful of this use of religion, 
seeing it corrupting God in order to further human self-interest. He mocked its practitioners by 
noting that “the oracles were consulted, and whatever they were made to say [by power-hungry 
men], became the law; and this sort of government lasted as long as the superstition lasted” 
(Paine 466). Needless to say, Paine held these governments founded upon priestcraft in the 
utmost contempt, and this aspect of his political anthropology contributed to his hatred of 
organized clergy, which he detailed extensively in The Age of Reason.  
The second form of government in Paine’s proto-historical materialism were those 
created by conquest, and it is here where Paine focuses a substantial portion of his analysis. The 
example Paine repeatedly refers to when discussing government by conquest is William I “The 
Conqueror,” Duke of Normandy and King of England, “whose government...was founded in 
power, and the sword assumed the name of the scepter” (Paine 466). To Paine, these forms of 
government could only last as long as the power behind them lingered, but he cautioned that the 
monarchs and aristocrats who controlled these systems would do anything in their ability to 
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prevent their usurpation. These conquerors, in Paine’s mind, “held [the] power of war and peace 
in [themselves], and [their] descendants have ever since claimed it under [them],” often using 
God or an obscure charter in an attempt to legitimize their rule (Paine 466-474). As an example, 
Paine argued that it was “easy to conceive that a band of interested men, such as Placemen, 
Pensioners, Lords of the bed-chamber, Lords of the kitchen, Lords of the necessaryhouse, and 
the Lord knows what besides,” under the guidance or jurisdiction of the conquerors, “can find as 
many reasons for monarchy as their salaries, paid at the expense of the country, amount to” 
(Paine 520). Since these forms of government intrinsically did not protect the natural and civil 
rights of its citizens, the people had a right to rise up in revolt against them in order to establish 
governments by reason, which will be explained in the final chapter.  
It is evident that the systems Paine both describes and criticizes are priestcraft (church 
government) and what would come to be known as feudalism. It is important to note that 
“feudalism” was not a term used in Paine’s time, being an invention of nineteenth century 
German historians, though it is clear he is primarily referring to the “kingdoms and 
communities” of medieval Europe. Modern scholarship largely rejects the use of the term, as it is 
essentially inaccurate, and not how medieval Europe, Japan, etc. referred to themselves.7 The 
reason I will be using the term “feudalism” in this thesis is because Jane Addams used the term 
frequently throughout her writing, and it is prominent within her political anthropology.  
With that in mind, feudalism was of particular concern to Paine, as he considered the 
British government of his time, the one he spent so much of his life fighting against, to be the 
same feudal system that William the Conqueror instituted when he secured the English crown 
after the Battle of Hastings in 1066. All that had changed was that figures like Edmund Burke 
                                                 
7  See. Brown for more information.  
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had, through unwritten “constitutions” and the formal incorporation of tradition into politics, 
created a veneer of freedom that merely put a veil over the same system with the same power 
dynamics there always were. Therefore, while, as mentioned previously, Paine believed that the 
United States and revolutionary France had established governments predicated on reason, the 
feudal system was very much alive in both Britain and continental Europe, having expanded 
itself to incorporate greater economic and colonial breadth, often using “tradition” as its basis 
(Paine 520-521). 
Addams approached her historical method from a similar position as Paine. It began with 
tribal forms of civilization, before progressing to feudalism, then a modified feudalism 
influenced by capitalism and the Enlightenment, before arriving at her normative argument for 
social democracy. The first or “lowest” form of civilization she identified was tribal in nature, 
based on Old World customs and traditions. While Addams’ theory, as mentioned previously, 
emphasized universal equality, her analyses of other cultures, especially at this level in her 
political anthropology, were racist. “Structuring the historical method was the assumption that 
civilization’s evolution was the story of cultural development from savage to primitive to 
civilized. This assumption is embedded in the language Addams uses to describe immigrants’ 
cultures of origins. Despite the obvious respect Addams had for her neighbors’ cultures, she still 
placed them early on the evolutionary scale” (Cultural Pluralism 20). This evolutionary scale 
highlights both the structure and fluidity of Addams’ political anthropology, as she correlated the 
complexity of culture with the complexity of social and political organization. She argued that 
while humans at this early stage of social evolution were capable of self-government, they 
frequently did not practice it, often referring to immigrants as “simple people” that were “still in 
the tribal stage of knowledge” (A Function of the Social Settlement 47). This understanding was 
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foundational to her arguments regarding sympathetic knowledge, which would in turn influence 
social, cultural, and political development. However, for Addams, these tribal hierarchical 
structures would become increasingly powerful over time, and eventually develop into so-called 
“feudal” societies.  
Like Paine, Addams devoted much of her intellectual attention to the “feudal” component 
of her political anthropology, though she did not do so in a formal, scholarly work. Instead, she 
constructed this element of her political anthropology through a series of speeches and short 
essays, primarily directed at women’s clubs and other working-class groups. For Addams, 
feudalism was not some construction of a perceived virtue in servitude, but, much like Paine’s 
government by conquest, a very specific method of social organization based on hierarchy and 
reciprocal obligations (Evolutionary Theorizing 72). The feudal household, which, to Addams, 
was also representative of the system’s governance, “was essentially a small village...it contained 
many servants and artisans in addition to the resident aristocrat’s immediate family. Social status 
was assigned at birth” (Evolutionary Theorizing 72). This hierarchy would proceed up the chain 
until arriving at the king himself, a model she believed had been applied consistently for 
thousands of years, especially in Europe. Addams believed that this system provoked a “deep 
mistrust” and generally amounted to “centuries of slavery” (Democracy and Social Ethics 46).  
While systems could vary, with lords and kings wielding varying degrees of authority, 
the theme of a few elites wielding broad amounts of power remained the same. Similarly to 
Paine, Addams thought that this system was unjust, and acted as a barrier for people 
understanding one another. Unlike Paine, Addams did believe that feudal systems could 
contribute to some moral good, even if the amount of good paled in comparison to that of the 
social settlement (Democracy and Social Ethics 29). This is because those domestic workers not 
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bound to a particular industrialist, much as some peasants were not bound to a particular feudal 
lord, “[had] complete control of [their] own time” (Democracy and Social Ethics 29). 
Where Paine’s influence, whether direct or indirect, comes in is when discussing his own 
era. Addams evaluated Enlightenment-era governments, and later capitalist systems, much in the 
same manner that Paine evaluated his own time (though she was far less forgiving, particularly 
of the United States). To Addams, the mercantilist and capitalist governments were still feudal, 
albeit expanded in order to encompass widespread private property ownership and greater 
political rights. Despite these changes, the hierarchical but ideally reciprocal relationships 
remained the same. That being said, Addams noted that the relationship between mistresses and 
servants, as well as capitalists and workers, were particularly feudal, and could serve as 
instruments of oppression when virtue was not expressed properly (Hull House 185-187). To 
Addams, the remedy, in her political anthropology, was a social democracy, which will be 
elaborated on shortly. For the purposes of this chapter, note that Addams considered Hull House 
to be a template for the wider social democracy she desired to construct, with the understanding 
that, as a pragmatist, Addams would have approved of any substantial reform.  
In sum, while Paine’s material analysis of history and Addams’ application of the 
historical method are not the same (Paine did not think that governments by conquest were any 
more advanced than governments by superstition), they are similar enough to one another to 
delineate a joint approach when assessing the rise and development of civilizations. While 
Addams was more judgmental of early civilizations than Paine, referring often to their primitive 
habits and cultures, both thinkers drew a clear path from tribal civilizations to so-called feudal 
civilizations before arriving at their respective normative arguments. What makes the two 
thinkers unique, and arguably more similar to one another than anyone else, is that both 
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identified most governments of the Enlightenment (and in Addams’ case capitalism) as an 
extension or development of feudalism rather than a separate method of social organization. This 
joint argument implied that the “modern” world was not as advanced, sophisticated, and virtuous 
as many thinkers of the era would have liked to believe. From this Paine-Addams perspective, 
the world still had a lot of work to do in order to ensure that people were the best possible 
versions of themselves, and civilization was still failing to achieve its essential obligations. The 




4. NORMATIVE CIVILIZATION 
It is in their normative arguments where Paine and Addams are perhaps the most closely 
aligned, even if their desired structures of government appear very different from one another on 
the surface. This is because, at their core, both of their ideal political systems had both extremely 
similar ends and a shared barometer for how the success of a civilization ought to be measured. 
Furthermore, both thinkers considered “benefit” in an unorthodox manner, viewing it from a 
universal perspective rather than one founded on elitism or simple majoritarianism. For a society 
to be just, it had to improve the moral and material condition of all of its members, as opposed to 
merely benefiting a majority or simply those who held political power. These unorthodox 
considerations were the backbone for normative arguments that differed substantially in structure 
but were united in the underlying understanding noted above. In this chapter, I will begin by 
contextualizing and then explaining what is known as Thomas Paine’s First Principle of 
Civilization, which served as his doctrine of universal improvement under a government. Then, I 
will describe Thomas Paine’s res publica (or representative republic), which he believed would 
satisfy the conditions laid out by the First Principle of Civilization. Then, I will sketch Jane 
Addams’ own principle when evaluating the justness of a civilization, and note its similarity to 
the First Principle of Civilization. Finally, I will detail Addams’ ideal “thick” democracy, which 
differed greatly from Paine’s res publica in structure, but shared with it numerous assumptions 
as well as a common purpose.  
 One component of Thomas Paine’s argument for the rise of civilization was that once a 
society removed itself from the state of nature, it could not return to it (Paine 398). But this 
posed a potential problem for the members of the society in question. If a particular individual 
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had been living well in the state of nature, and consented to the creation of a government as to 
provide “mutual assistance and protection” (Boller 67), the expectation was that their material 
condition would improve. For Paine, “to preserve the benefits of what is called civilized 
life...ought to be considered one of the first objects of reformed legislation” (Paine 397). As 
Paine emphasized repeatedly in Agrarian Justice, this did not occur some if not most of the time. 
After all, in Paine’s mind, “the condition of millions…is far worse than if they had been born 
before civilization began” (Paine 398). “Poverty,” Paine noted, “is a thing created by that which 
is called civilized life,” and “the life of an Indian8 is a continual holiday...compared with the 
poor of Europe” (Paine 397). The rich, however, obviously saw their material and social standing 
improve to a disproportionate extent. They were not among the millions who suffered due to the 
abandonment of the state of nature. Paine’s First Principle of Civilization, then, was envisioned 
as a simple measure to determine if a government was acting justly, or at the very least a goal for 
governments to consider when crafting policy.  
Paine determined that “the first principle of civilization ought to have been, and ought 
still to be, that the condition of every person born into the world, after a state of civilization 
commences, ought not to be worse than if he had been born before that period” (Paine 398). 
Despite the fact that this argument was meant as contextualization for the wealth redistribution 
policies Paine would propose later in Agrarian Justice, it had enormous implications for his 
entire political anthropology — especially given the fact that Paine had not wavered from the 
political theory he had expressed a half decade earlier in Rights of Man. It meant that, as a 
normative prescription, governments had a moral obligation to improve the conditions in which 
                                                 
8 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Paine considered indigenous Americans to be living in the state of nature, though he 
did not mean this as a slight or an argument for inferiority. There is some evidence that he was fond of the Iroquois 




their citizens lived. It was not sufficient for a government to ensure that some or most of their 
constituents saw improvements over the state of nature. Instead, all citizens had to see a marked 
improvement in order for the government in question to be considered just. Paine believed that 
this level of justice could only be achieved by a government founded upon reason, which he 
typically referred to as a res publica.  
The res publica, translated as the “public thing,” constituted the origin of the term 
“republic,” but Paine saw fit to distinguish his res publica from so-called republics like Poland, 
the Netherlands, and presumably Rome, all of which lacked the genuinely representative 
components that Paine desired (Paine 565). He considered res publica to be “a word of [good 
origin], referring to what ought to be the character and business of government” (Paine 565). 
Paine did not claim that the res publica, or “republic” as he would use thereafter, necessarily had 
to be tied to any particular structure of government, but that “it most naturally [associated] with 
the representative form” (Paine 565-566). In Paine’s eyes, the people, those who would be liable 
for the expenses of government, should be the ones to control its actions and proceedings. The 
proper business of government, as mentioned previously in this thesis, was to defend the natural 
and civic rights of the people, accede to the First Principle of Civilization, and maintain free and 
open commerce. This put Paine at direct odds with monarchical and aristocratic forms of 
government, both of which were subject to heavy criticism in Rights of Man. But Paine also 
cautioned (in contradistinction to Addams) against direct democracy, fearing that a nation, either 
or both in geography and population, could become too large to sustain it. In the end, it is clear 
that the form of government Paine preferred was a representative republic, which he thought was 
best exemplified by the young United States — in whose founding he had been an extremely 
active participant.  
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Paine certainly had his qualms with the American Constitution. He was skeptical of the 
need for the Senate (Paine 586), and he wrote an entire essay arguing that veto power should not 
exist. It is fair to conclude, however, that it came the closest to his ideal constitution. His concern 
was in the enacting of laws, which he concluded was the role of the legislature, and the execution 
of laws, which, in the United States, existed within the purview of both the president and the 
judiciary (Paine 583-584). As the government ought to be concerned with protecting rights, 
Paine was also an enthusiastic advocate for the Bill of Rights (Conneen and Larsen), which he 
saw as necessary to prevent government from acquiring too much power. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly for his political anthropology (and what, as we will discover, ties him to 
Addams), is his union between written constitutions and the importance of lived experience. A 
constitution, to Paine, should not bind generations to it forever. The world, as well as the people 
who live in it, change over time, and Paine thought constitutions should reflect that 
understanding. “Assemblies,” Paine determined, “legislate according to the principles and forms 
prescribed in [their] constitution; and if experience should hereafter shew that alterations, 
amendments, or additions are necessary, the constitution will point out the mode by which such 
things shall be done, and not leave it to the discretionary power of the future government” (Paine 
469).  
As mentioned previously in this thesis, Addams’ disinterest in abstractions meant that, 
unlike Paine, she never elucidated a concept as clear and unique as the First Principle of 
Civilization. However, it is evident in her works that, likely due to her familiarity with Paine, she 
believed in a civilizational obligation akin to the First Principle of Civilization. Addams’ view of 
a civilization, in a nutshell, is encapsulated by a remark she made during a 1933 speech in 
Honolulu, Hawaii that claimed that “civilization is a method of living, an attitude of equal 
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respect for all men” (Waller). This method of living and equal attitude of respect, however, 
would not be possible (at least from a normative perspective) without civilizations improving 
people’s lives compared to what came before, as “the highest moralists have taught that without 
the advance and improvement of the whole, no man can hope for any lasting improvement in his 
own moral or material individual condition” (Hull House 127). But, the concept of 
“improvement” could not, for Addams, be based on an abstraction. If one were to evaluate a 
civilization based on an abstraction, one would be allowing themselves to “be content with a 
shadowy intellectual or aesthetic reflection of [the world]” (Hull House 64). Addams determined 
that social or “thick” democracy could serve to improve the moral and material condition of 
every member of a given society.  
As was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, Addams was far more skeptical of the 
representative republic that Paine. While Paine had the utmost faith that human reason would 
serve to maintain a representative republic, including that of the United States, and permit it to 
change as needed, Addams found it “difficult to hold [America’s] political democracy and to 
make it in any sense a social expression and not a mere governmental contrivance, unless we 
take pains to keep on common ground in our human experiences” (Democracy and Social Ethics 
51). The American republic, Addams thought, had not sufficiently accounted for residual 
feudalism, as well as its transformation into capitalism.  
Before delving further into Addams’ social democracy, it is important to note that, as a 
pragmatist, Addams preferred to eschew making the perfect the enemy of the good. She often 
noted that that quality was a common trait of the abstract theorists she so derided. She was a 
reformer, not a revolutionary or utopian in the manner of Paine. If a policy or program would 
push Addams towards her goals within the current system, she would be inclined to support it. 
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For example, Addams had a long and complicated relationship with U.S. president Theodore 
Roosevelt. While they had numerous differences and sometimes fiery disagreements concerning 
policy and philosophy, she was still a passionate supporter of Roosevelt’s 1912 presidential 
campaign (Hest). Addams would continue to defend her support of Roosevelt long after the 
latter’s defeat, even after their 1915 sparring match concerning America’s involvement in World 
War I. 
In essence, Addams viewed democracy as far more than an institutional arrangement. 
Democracy was not a set system that either existed or did not exist. Instead, democracy was, for 
Addams, a way of life rooted in “diversified human experience and resultant sympathy” 
(Democracy and Social Ethics 7), qualities that could be measured scientifically, and the source 
for the expression of social ethics9. Thus, the heart of democracy was, in Addams’ mind, the 
“conviction that we are under a moral obligation in choosing our experiences, since the result of 
those experiences must ultimately determine our understanding of life” (Democracy and Social 
Ethics 7-8). The most important habits that would make a democracy successful were 
communication and mutual understanding, as they would appropriately and universally guide 
people towards civic virtue. As such, democracy was not only present in political situations. 
Since Addams argued that the core of democracy was the sympathy derived from common 
experiences, democracy then served as a component of nearly all interpersonal relationships, 
from the dynamics between factory owners and their workers to the relationship between parents 
and their adult daughters. The ills of society could often be traced to a lack of democracy, and 
the appropriate remedy was more democracy (Democracy and Social Ethics 8), which Addams 
pushed for relentlessly.   
                                                 
9 This is also called “sympathetic knowledge,” a term Addams used frequently. For more information, see either of 
the Fischer entries in the bibliography.  
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Furthermore, as democracy prospered or suffered, so too would the fortunes of all people 
— whether it be materially or morally. The main principle of Addams’ normative argument, 
then, was that a given society should try to maximize the amount of democracy within it in order 
to improve the moral and material conditions of all. The interrelated themes within this notion of 
democracy make it extremely difficult to label or compartmentalize, and this was no coincidence 
(Shields 21). In a similar vein to Paine’s res publica, Addams’ democracy could come in many 
forms and was not singularly associated with a set institutional structure, provided that whatever 
was chosen was not oppressive and represented people’s experiences properly. Set structures 
resulted in “old-fashioned ways...no longer [applying] to changed conditions” (Ballot for Woman 
Made Necessary). Most important was that everyone who would be directly impacted by 
political decisions have a seat at the table, since it was a tall task to improve an individual’s life 
if governed by those who did not know or understand them.  
It is this commitment to the everyday experiences of regular people that unite the 
normative arguments of Paine and Addams. The First Principle of Civilization was not merely 
some abstraction — it stood as both a moral obligation and a barometer used to evaluate a 
civilization’s success. While Paine was the one who sketched it, Addams held such a uniquely 
identical commitment that it is unlikely that its source was anyone but Paine. For both theorists, 
civilizations did not exist to satisfy the whims and desires of the elites, nor could its obligations 
be satisfied by improvements to a mere majority. They thought that civilization, the replacement 
of war with law, would fail if every person was not better off than they were in the state of 
nature. Paine and Addams differed in their interpretations of what a satisfactory civilization 
would look like, as Paine had a greater faith in rights and constitutions than Addams, yet they 
both desired civilizations firmly based on the lived experiences of a society’s members. Without 
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this influence of lived experience, society would be bound to ancient abstractions or institutions 
that become outdated and oppressive (if they were not oppressive to begin with). This union of 
purpose indicates that, more than anything, Paine and Addams’ political anthropologies were 





It is evident, in the end, that Paine and Addams utilized thoroughly similar approaches to 
political anthropology. In their respective inquiries as to how humans lived before the rise of 
civilization, their overall analysis was similar, with the state of nature being an equal and social 
place prone to outbreaks of violence, necessitating the formation of a government as a method of 
ensuring both peace and justice. The state of nature was, at least in-part, determined by the 
generally good nature of humankind, as well as the human tendency to apply reason (or “cosmic 
patriotism,” as Addams sometimes called it) to seek out social situations, value interpersonal 
engagement, and request assistance with daily tasks and challenges.  
 With the formation of governments, Paine and Addams then began to analyze the rise of 
civilizations. While Paine’s analysis is referred to in this thesis as a material understanding of 
history, and Addams’ analysis is referred to as a variant of the historical method, these two 
approaches were functionally almost identical. Their chronologies of history both began with 
tribal or religious societies before evolving into the durable, “feudal” societies that they each 
considered themselves to be living in (though Paine did argue that the infant United States had 
progressed past a feudal system).  
To conclude their account of the rise of civilization, Paine and Addams zeroed in on their 
normative arguments. Their normative arguments differed substantially. Paine had great faith in 
his res publica, and was confident that institutional structures designed under that framework 
could change as needed. Addams, on the other hand, was skeptical of all abstractions, whether 
those be rights or documents based on those rights, and argued that only more democracy could 
remedy the ills of civilization. However, both Addams and Paine uniquely built their normative 
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arguments on a shared understanding that civilization ought to improve the lives of every single 
one of its members when compared to the state of nature, through what Paine called the First 
Principle of Civilization. Furthermore, both thinkers were concerned with generational change, 
and maintained that civilization should reflect the world as it is, rather than embrace the ideas of 
the past without change or question.  
With the above revelations in mind, it becomes clear that Thomas Paine’s influence in the 
nineteenth century was not as muted as originally thought. Based on Jane Addams’ honorary 
vice presidency in the TPMA, as well as clear signs of Paine’s influence in her political 
anthropology, it is evident that she was at least in some way affected by him. That being said, I 
make no claim that this thesis is an exhaustive account of Thomas Paine’s influence on Jane 
Addams. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that Paine’s influence on Addams, at least to some 
extent, existed through an intermediary theorist. These intermediary theorists could serve as 
excellent avenues for further exploration. I will briefly sketch three of these possibilities, without 
excluding others.  
The first is Mary Wollstonecraft, who was the author of A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman and one of the most important and influential early feminist writers. While serving as an 
editor for the Analytical Review, Wollstonecraft became involved in the same social circle as 
Thomas Paine (Brander), and his “Rights of Man” terminology became prominent within her 
own writing.  It would be highly surprising if Addams, a prominent feminist, champion of the 
suffrage movement, and exceptionally well-read scholar, did not come into contact with 
Wollstonecraft’s writing at some point in time.  
The second is Abraham Lincoln. As was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, a 
young Abraham Lincoln was a closeted but avid follower of Thomas Paine (Brookheiser). 
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Paine’s deism and account of politics would remain with Lincoln throughout the rest of the 
latter’s life, and serve as a backdrop for Lincoln’s later unionism. Addams, in turn, was 
influenced by Lincoln, in terms of both childish heroism and later scholarly thought. She credited 
Lincoln with illuminating the idea that “democratic government, associated as it is with all the 
mistakes and shortcomings of the common people, still remains the most valuable contribution 
America has made to the moral life of the world” (Hull House 42). Thus, Paine’s potential 
influence here could be explored as well.  
The third is Clarence Darrow, a prominent Chicago attorney and political contributor 
who lectured at Hull House on multiple occasions. Darrow, like Addams, was a member of the 
TPMA (Marotta 187-188), and the two had a close relationship that spanned many decades. In 
one letter written in 1932, Addams addresses him as “my dear Mr. Darrow” (Letter to Clarence 
Darrow). Considering the nature of their friendship, as well as their mutual involvement in the 
TPMA, it is theoretically possible that Darrow could have introduced Addams (or vice versa) to 
Paine in some meaningful way. 
The true magnitude of Thomas Paine’s legacy is still being evaluated, but, based on the 
historical record as well as a theoretical analysis, it is clear that Jane Addams’ political 
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